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Abstract—This paper presents a multi-agent security 
architecture, which utilizes the agent characteristics to cater 
for security processes in online communications. The 
Multilayer Communication approach (MLC) [1] is used to 
determine the security processes, which uses cryptography 
protocols to secure data and communication channel. Agents 
are skilled to perform certain tasks. At the Sender’s host, 
agents interact with each other to secure a message to be sent 
to the Recipient, including encryption, digital signature, and 
hash code. A mobile agent is used to carry the encrypted 
messages as well as the agent’s code to the Recipient’s host. 
Our approach also provides mechanisms to verify the 
authenticity, confidentiality and the integrity of the code and 
data that arrived at the Recipient’s host. The message and the 
code are authenticated, the code is executed to perform tasks to 
recover the plaintext.  
Keywords-e-health; security, cryptography; multi-agent; 
mobile agent; 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
Ever since the first time people started to become aware 
of the value of information, they are also conscious about the 
underlying security issues. Reliance to the Internet as a 
medium of communications to exchange and share 
information has become so prevalent. However, the Internet 
network is exposed to many security threats. An organization 
needs to protect their system so that their valuable 
information would not be harmed or stolen by irresponsible 
intruders. A number of security technologies exist as a mean 
to secure the communication environment. However, there 
exist many threats to the Internet. For example network 
attacks, information breaches, and malicious software, which 
is a program that is purposely created to perform illegal 
operation on the computer system, such as viruses and 
worms. These threats can cause severe damages to the 
computer systems as well as the information. The 
information might be stolen or modified and may cause 
undesirable consequences. Therefore, it is important to 
secure online communications which uses the Internet.  
Using these problems as a motivation, we proposed a 
security model that caters for the security needs for online 
communications between two nodes (say n1 and n2). This 
model can be adapted for different kinds of domains. In our 
model, focus is given to strengthen the application and 
transport layers on the Open System Interconnection (OSI) 
model [2] (Figure 1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  Securing application and session layers in the OSI Model. 
In our approach, cryptography protocols are used and 
applied on data at the application layer, as well as on the 
communication channel using SSL/TLS at the transport 
layer. The Multilayer Communication approach (MLC) [1] is 
used to determine the security processes that will be applied 
to the messages exchanged between nodes. The multi-agent 
system approach is chosen to cater for the security processes 
at the Sender and Recipient’s hosts. The rest of the paper is 
organized like the following: Section 2 discuses the MLC 
approach. Section 3 discusses the related work. Next, the 
proposed security model is discussed in Section 4. Then, 
Section 5 describes the implementation, followed by the 
result in Section 6. Finally this paper is concluded with a 
summary in Section 6. 
II. THE MLC APPROACH 
The MLC approach is discussed in this section to ease 
the understanding of our proposed security model.  
Sensitive data and the sensitivity: During a 
communication, say between nodes n1 and n2, different 
types of information are exchanged. There is information 
that can be considered as sensitive, or less sensitive, or no 
sensitive at all. Sensitive information are those that should 
not be revealed to public [3]. Whether the information is 
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sensitive or not is based on the importance or the values of 
the information. It is important to assess the value of the 
information and the consequence it will cause if it is made 
public or fall to the wrong hand. The levels of sensitivities of 
the data refers to the degrees of loss or risks that might 
happen if the data are disclosed to a party that does not have 
any authority, or which has a lower level access to the data.  
TABLE I.  THE CLASSIFICATION AND SECURITY MECHANISMS IN THE 
MLC APPROACH 
A name, a place, and a meeting time, are probably less 
sensitive than a name, an address, and types of diseases, 
which can be associated together to make someone assumes 
that that person with that name is actually having that types 
of illness. Other example that fall into this category is 
information in electronic business operation. For instance, a 
supplier’s bid must not be revealed to other suppliers, or 
trade secret information must not be disclosed to other 
parties or their competitors. There is also information that 
can be considered as less sensitive. For example an 
employee communicates with a system administrator of a 
company regarding his technical problem on his computer, 
or a nurse communicates with a social worker regarding a 
patient’s name and his ward’s number. The less sensitive 
information, if it is made public, will not bring much risk to 
the company, but still it must not be revealed to public.  
No sensitive information includes general information of 
a company or general information on health or diseases that 
can be made public. 
Communication classification: We have proposed a 
Multilayer Communication approach (MLC) [1] that 
characterizes the communication between different users into 
five different layers: Layer 1 to Layer 5, namely Extremely 
Sensitive, Highly Sensitive, Medium Sensitive, Low 
Sensitive and No Sensitive Data, in descending order. We 
determined the level of sensitivity of the data based on the 
roles or users who are exchanging the data. Using an e-health 
domain as an example, we identified the users in the e-health 
as Doctor, Patient, Nurse, Social Worker (SW), Paramedic, 
System Coordinator (SC), and System Administrator (SA), 
such as described in Table1. Different security mechanisms 
can be provided at each layer depending on the sensitivity of 
the data. Highest security mechanisms can be applied to the 
extremely sensitive information, while low security 
mechanisms can be applied to the low sensitive information. 
MLC treats every communication differently based on the 
sensitivity of the information being exchanged unlike Virtual 
Private Network (VPN) or Secure Shell (SSH). By providing 
different security mechanisms in every layer, an organization 
can choose its own security mechanisms flexibly, depending 
on cost and performance. 
Security mechanisms: In each layer, a user can choose 
either to apply data security, channel security or both. Data 
security involves encryption, digital signature and hash of 
data, while channel encryption provides a secure SSL/TLS 
channel to transfer the data. A range of key lengths for data 
encryption is provided for every layer. 
The key length: Each layer is associated with the length 
of the symmetric keys that are used for encryption (described 
in Table1). Higher layer uses longer key length and lower 
layer uses shorter key length. As we can see in Table I, Layer 
2 provides key lengths, ranging from 80-bit key to 191-bit 
key, which started with a rather short key length (from 80-
bit). This is because we are taking into account 
communications with wireless devices that have low 
processing powers. Only data security is applied in Layer 2. 
The details of the MLC approach can be found in [13]. The 
next section describes the related work for this research. 
III. RELATED WORK  
The use of multi-agents system has become a well 
accepted paradigm to support online communication to 
exchange messages over the network. The agents are used to 
cater for the communication processes as well as the security 
mechanisms applied to the message before transmitting the 
Layer of 
Communication 
E.g. of Types of 
Data  
Security Mechanisms  
Layer 1:  
Extremely 
Sensitive data 
Doctor⇔Doctor   
Doctor⇔Patient 
Doctor⇔Nurse 
Nurse⇔Patient 
Patient’s personal 
information, 
medical history, 
diagnosis, test 
result, current 
treatment and 
prescriptions 
Data and 
channel 
security 
192-bit 
key and 
longer  
 
 
Layer 2:  Highly 
sensitive data 
Paramedic⇔SC 
 
Patient’s personal 
information, 
medical 
information: 
allergic, blood 
pressure, current 
condition 
 
Data 
security 
(using 
wireless 
network) 
 
80-bit 
key to 
191-bit 
key 
 
 
Layer 3:  Medium 
sensitive data 
Doctor⇔SW 
Nurse⇔SW 
 
Patient’s personal 
information, 
medication 
information  
 
Channel 
security or 
data 
security 
 
112-bit 
key 
to128-bit 
key 
 
 
Layer 4:   
Low sensitive data 
SA ⇔ all users 
 
Information on the 
application system, 
user account, non-
medical related 
information such as 
IT technical 
problem 
 
Channel 
security or 
data 
security 
 
80-bit  to 
less than 
112-bit 
of key  
 
 
Layer 5:   
No sensitive data 
or Public 
The public  
 
Open channel: 
general 
information on the 
organization, 
health, diseases, 
FAQ, public 
reports, and 
services available 
 
Secure 
open 
channel: 
ID and 
password  
- 
 
Secure open 
channel: any user 
that wants to get 
access or contact 
information to any 
sensitive 
information (e.g.: a 
researcher)  
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message to the intended recipient. Cryptography protocols 
such as encryption/decryption, digital signature, and hash 
message are chosen as the security mechanisms. For 
example, Yenta [4] is a multi agent application for 
matchmaking purposes that introduces users with similar 
interests. Yenta uses symmetric encryptions to secure data 
and PKI to exchange keys. Data is also verified using hash 
message. The X-Security prototype [5] is another example of 
multi agent application that provides security for online 
communication. It uses central server that issues certificates 
for every agent as a proof of identity as well as for session 
key exchanged. 
Moreno et al. [6] use multi-agent system to provide 
medical services. The system authenticates every agent that 
wants to enter the system. Communications between agents 
through container or host are through SSL-enabled channel. 
To communicate with the main container, every agent must 
deal with a broker agent, who checks other agent’s identity 
through a signature, through a public key mechanism to 
prevent other agents from stealing or forging their identities. 
Alsinet el al. [7] developed a multi-agent system architecture 
to monitor medical protocols. Agents interact to provide 
different services. Messages are encrypted and signed. 3DES 
algorithm is used for encryption and exchanged using public 
key RSA mechanism. Certificates are used to distribute 
users’ public keys. 
These works stated above are without doubt providing 
security to the communications and data transmission and 
hence protecting the privacy of the data based on the 
cryptographic protocols. However, these approaches view all 
communications between users to be the same, and hence, all 
communications will be secured by the same security 
processes. In our approach, through MLC, we provide a 
range of security mechanisms through multiple layers of 
communication. The different combinations of security 
mechanisms in MLC provide flexibilities to the organization 
to choose the most suitable security processes in terms of 
cost and performance. For example, we can choose SSL, 
which is cheaper, rather than data encryption [8]. Moreover, 
low processing power devices, such as PDAs and smart 
phones may require only data encryption with a range of 
appropriate key lengths, which can save processing 
resources. Next, we discuss the proposed security model and 
the security mechanisms. 
IV. THE PROPOSED SECURITY MODEL  
A. The Multi-agent Approach 
Our proposed model is based on the multi-agent system 
approach. An agent is defined as a computer system that can 
receive input and output from the environment, autonomous 
and flexible [9]. The agent-based technology is chosen in this 
research because of the advantages of being able to support 
the implementation of complex programs in the distributed 
environment, such as the Internet. An agent can represent a 
user and do tasks on behalf of the user. Agents can be given 
knowledge to do specific task and interact with each other in 
order to solve a given task. For instance, in a Sender and 
Recipient communication, an interface agent interacts with 
Sender and takes messages from the interactions. The agent 
then forwards the message to another agent to apply 
appropriate security mechanisms on it. To send the message, 
a mobile agent is instantiated and dispatched to carry the 
message to the Recipient’s host. 
Figure 2.  The proposed security model. 
Before sending the message, Sender agent first makes a 
request to send a message to the Recipient’s agent. If there is 
no answer, Sender agent may take necessary steps to keep 
the message and try to send it again later, or delete it if it is 
already exceeded a certain period of time with a notice to the 
user. This shows that the agent is autonomous, and it does 
not need user's intervention and can do tasks on its own. In 
addition, agent systems are extendible. A new agent can be 
created instantly and added to the existing system to perform 
a certain task, and terminate itself after finishing its tasks 
without reconfiguring the system. 
The mobile agent is used because of its ability to perform 
tasks on behalf of the owner at remote hosts. A mobile agent 
from Sender can be dispatched to carry sensitive information 
and its code to the Recipient’s platform. There, the agent 
negotiates with an agent that resides in the Recipient’s host 
to execute its code. In addition, mobile agents are robust, in a 
sense that if the Recipient’s platform is shut down while the 
agent is still there, the agent may take necessary actions to 
migrate back or terminate its activities [10]. It can send a 
notice to the home platform about its situation and terminate 
if required. 
Figure 2 describes the proposed multi-agent based 
security model in a layered structure. In our model, every 
agent is skilled to perform certain tasks. The agents 
coordinate with each other to perform security processes in 
order to secure data or channel. There are eight main types of 
agents described as Interface Agent (IA), Communication 
Manager Agent (CMA), Multilayer Communication Agent 
(MCA), Communication Listener Agent (CLA), Receiver 
Agent (RA), crypto Agent (cA), SetUp Agent (SUA) and 
MobileAgent (MA). 
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IA provides users with user interfaces and interacts with 
them. IA first gets the user ID and password to authenticate 
the user into the system. If the user is authorized, IA 
provides an interface to create new message and view any 
received message. To create a new message, the user may 
write the text message and specify the recipient(s). IA then 
takes the list of recipient(s) and the text message, and sends 
it to CMA that manages the information. CMA and MCA 
interact with each other to organize the message to be sent to 
the recipient(s). 
When the user (in this case, Sender) composes a new 
message, MCA makes a request to the Recipient’s host to 
send a message. If the Recipient’s host agrees, then MCA 
notifies cA, which in turn applies appropriate security 
mechanisms to the message. As mentioned before, every 
message must be secured according to MLC approach. MLC 
specifications for each layer are stored at the Layer 
Specification Library (LSL). LSL contains available 
algorithms, key lengths, encryption mode and padding 
information for symmetric key encryption. For each 
recipient, cA creates an instance of SUA that will be 
responsible to apply the cryptography protocols according to 
the security specification. After finish applying the security 
mechanisms, SUA creates an instance of MA that will be 
used to carry the encrypted message to the Recipient’s host. 
There, MA executes the code to decrypt the message. 
At the Recipient’s host, CLA listens to any request from 
other users. When a request is received, and the Sender is 
authorized (the certificate of the sender is in the list of trusted 
user) then, CLA creates an instance of Receiver Agent (RA) 
that will wait for the message from the Sender. RA will be 
responsible to entertain the mobile agents arrive at the host. 
B. Control of the data  
In our approach, we focus on how Sender can securely 
transfer data to Recipient while maintaining control over the 
data. The ‘control over the data’ can be described as (1) if 
the message carried by Sender Agent is seized by an 
attacker, the attacker still cannot recover the plaintext, (2) 
recipient or any other third party does not need to know the 
details of the decryption processes to recover the plaintext. 
One way for Sender to gain control over the data, is to keep 
part of the requirements for the decryption processes secret, 
such as part of the agent’s code, or parameters used for 
decryption. The parameters for decrypting the ciphertext are 
kept with Sender until he/she knows that MA needs it. The 
parameters contain the symmetric key that encrypts the 
plaintext, hash of plaintext (for Recipient to verify the 
plaintext), and the information about the key, such as the 
types of the algorithms, key length, and encryption mode. 
A token, which is an encrypted random number, is 
carried by MA to the Recipient’s host. It is used as a ‘phone 
home’ [11] mechanism for the agent to tell Sender that it 
wants the information kept at the Sender’s side to continue 
its task. The ‘phone home’ method is a way for the mobile 
agent to contact Sender from the Recipient’s host, to tell 
Sender that it needs necessary information for the decryption 
processes. 
The authenticity of the agent’s code is verified once it 
arrives at the host. If the agent’s code is valid, it is executed. 
At this point, the agent is ready to perform the decryption 
process to recover the plaintext. This is where the agent 
sends the token back to Sender. 
C. The Communication Protocols 
Consider that we have two parties communicating 
between Patient and Doctor. Patient wants to send a plaintext 
(P) to Doctor. We assume that certificates exchange has been 
done through a secure channel that makes Patient trusted by 
Doctor. Patient is represented by SetUp Agent (SUA), which 
dispatches a mobile agent (MA) to the Doctor’s side. At the 
Doctor’s side, Doctor is represented by Receiver Agent 
(RA), which is responsible to interact with the incoming 
MA. The communication protocols between SUA, MA and 
RA are described in Figure 3. 
 
 
Figure 3.  Communication protocols for SUA, MA, and RA  
Consider that MCA has accepted an “Agree“ answer 
from CLA. MCA tells cA about a new message to send, and 
cA creates an instance of SUA. After preparing the message, 
SUA creates and dispatches an instance of MA to carry the 
data to the Doctor’s host. Once arrived, MA initiates a 
communication with RA. MA requests RA to process the 
carried data. RA then processes the data and informs MA 
whether the code is valid or not to be executed. If the code is 
valid, MA retrieves the token, and requests RA to sign it. 
Once signed, MA sends the token back to SUA. SUA 
processes the token, and if the token is not tampered, SUA 
sends information for decryption process to MA. When the 
information is received, MA performs the decryption process 
to recover P. When P is recovered, MA sends P and H(P) to 
RA for verification. RA informs MA for the verification 
result and finally, MA informs SUA and terminates. 
D. The Proposed Security Mechanism  
This section discusses the proposed security mechanism, 
mainly the cryptography protocols that are used to secure 
data and mobile agent’s code. We refer to the previous 
example in Section 4(C). The following symbols will be 
used throughout this paper: 
• Recipient/Doctor’s public/private keys: (pubKr, 
privKr) 
• Sender/Patient’s public/private keys: (pubKs, privKs) 
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• Symmetric keys: K1, K2;  
• Disposable public and secret key: (Kp, Ks) 
• Information about the key: lsl 
• Plaintext, P; Hash of P, H(P) 
• Agent’s code: Cd; Hash of Cd, H(Cd) 
• Ciphertext, C; Signature, S 
• A Random number Rand; Token, T 
 
1) At the Sender’s host, SUA does the following:  
i. Generates two symmetric keys (K1 and K2)  
ii. K1 is used to encrypt P to produce a ciphertext, 
C. K1 is also used to encrypt Rand to generate a 
token, T that will be carried by the agent.  
  C = E(P)K1, T = E(Rand)K1 
K1 is kept at the Sender’s side until SUA 
receives T from MA at the remote host. 
iii. Generates asymmetric keys, public and secret 
key (Kp, Ks). Ks is used to encrypt hashKey 
(detailed at point 2(v)) when SUA receives T 
from the MA. Kp will be kept in Cd and sent to 
the Patient’s host. The generation of (Kp, Ks) is 
one time per communication session. (Kp, Ks) 
will be disposed once the communication session 
is over to avoid being used by any third party for 
the next communication session.  
iv. Create a .jar file containing the agent’s code to 
be executed at the Recipient’s host, called Cd. 
Sign Cd with privKs to produce a signature, S, 
which is used to verify that Cd is from Sender. S 
will be encrypted so that it cannot be removed 
and replaced by any party except RA.  
S = E(Cd)privKs 
v. Encrypts Cd, S, and T with K2 to produce 
Ciphercode.  
Ciphercode = E(Cd, S, T)K2 
vi. To allow only RA to retrieve K2, it is encrypted 
with pubKr together with the hash of Cd, H(Cd) 
to produce Cipherkey.  
Cipherkey = E(K2, H(Cd))pubkr 
vii. Save C, Ciphercode and Cipherkey into a file. 
Establishes SSL connection if necessary, and 
dispatch a mobile agent to send the file to the 
Recipient’s host. 
 
2) At the Sender’s host, SUA does the following:  
i. RA uses privKr to decrypt Cipherkey 
D(Cipherkey) privKr = K2, H(Cd) 
ii. Then, K2 is used to decrypt Ciphercode 
D(Ciphercode)K2 = Cd, S, T 
iii. To check that Cd is indeed come from Sender, S 
is verified against Cd 
iv. The integrity of Cd is also checked using H(Cd). 
v. If Cd is not violated, then Cd is executed. 
a. Get T and request RA to sign it. 
b. Once signed, T is sent back to SUA, to 
indicate that MA is ready for the 
decryption process. 
c. Upon receiving T, SUA verifies the 
signature and decrypts T with K1. If T is 
not modified, then SUA encrypts K1, 
information on K1 (lsl), and H(P) with Ks 
to produce hashKey. The corresponding 
Kp is stored within the code Cd.  
hashKey = E(K1,lsl,H(P))Ks 
Then, hashKey is sent back to MA.  
d. hashKey is received from SUA 
e. Again at the Recipient’s host, Cd retrieves 
Kp, and use it to decrypt hashKey to 
obtain K1, lsl, and H(P).  
f. Cd uses K1 and lsl to decrypt the 
ciphertext to get plaintext, P.  
g. Afterwards, both P and H(P) will be 
forwarded to RA for verifying purposes.  
vi. Finally, RA verifies P by calculating a new H(P) 
from P, and compare it with the one forwarded 
earlier. If proved valid, keep P.  
The next sections onwards describe the implementation 
of the security model. 
V. IMPLEMENTATION 
We have implemented the proposed security model as a 
proof-of-concept, using Jade [12], a Java-based FIPA-
compliant agent platform. Each user’s machine runs the Jade 
agent platform. Each platform is able to accept foreign 
agents (which are the mobile agents) by using inter-platform 
mobility service. Each agent is created with behaviours that 
represent the agent tasks. Classes of IA, CLA, CMA, MCA, 
and cA are instantiated by every platform, so that each 
platform can act as both Sender and Recipient. For agent 
interactions, we implement it using FIPA-compliant ACL 
Language and ontology. 
When a message is received from MCA, cA looks up at 
the LSL for a suitable algorithm and key length. cA creates 
an instance of SUA that is responsible for applying 
appropriate security mechanisms on the plaintext. Figure 4 
describe pseudocodes for SUA.  
 
Class SUA:(address,RAname,lsl,textfile) 
Start 
Create .jar file (Cd) 
Initialize privKs, pubKr 
privKs=ExtractPrivK(Sender’s keystore) 
pubKr=ExtractPubK(recipient’s certificate). 
Generate (K1, K2) and (Ks, Kp) 
Initialize Ciphertext, Token 
Ciphertext =Encrypt(textfile, K1) 
Generate a random number, rand 
Token=Encrypt(rand,K1) 
Take the agent’s code Cd: 
Initialize S, H(p), H(Cd) 
S = Sign(Cd,privKs) 
H(p)= computeHash(textfile) 
H(Cd)=computeHash(Cd) 
Initialize Ciphercode, Cipherkey  
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Ciphercode=Encrypt((Cd, S, T)K2 
Cipherkey=Encrypt(H(Cd), K2)pubKr 
Save Ciphertext, Ciphercode, and 
Cipherkey into a file 
CreateNewMobileAgent(address, RAname)  
DispatchMA(address, message file) 
IF mobile agent request for hashKey 
Initialize hashKey 
hashKey=Encrypt(HP),K1, LSL) 
Send hashKey to mobile agent 
END-IF 
End 
Figure 4.  The pseudocode for SUA. 
SUA is responsible for applying suitable security 
mechanisms according to the LSL value. It first makes a .jar 
file called Cd, to package the agent classes that are to be 
executed in the recipient’s platform. Then, it takes the 
recipient’s certificates and extracts the public key. Then it 
generates appropriate symmetric keys according to the LSL 
specification.  
MA carries the message to the recipient’s host, and there 
it will communicate with RA. Figure 5 describes the 
pseudocode for MA. When Cd is proved to be valid by RA, 
it is executed. Cd extracts information from hashKey to 
obtain the hash of the plain text, H(P), K1 for decryption, 
and LSL. Then K1 is loaded and recreated based on the LSL 
specification. Afterwards, using K1, Cd decrypts the 
ciphertext to obtain the actual text message such as described 
in Figure 6. 
class MA:ACLMessage msg) 
START 
Send REQUEST (“Process-Message”) 
Receives INFORM for result (“Process-
Message”). 
IF result == Valid (indicating that both the 
agent’s code and the signature are valid) 
Send REQUEST (“Sign-Token”) 
Send signed Token to SUA  
Receive hashKey from SUA 
Un-jarred Cd. 
Send REQUEST to the AMS to execute Cd 
(parameter: hashKey, ciphertext) 
END-IF 
IF (“Finish-Encrypting”) is received 
Send INFORM to SUA to return result from 
Cd  
END-IF 
Terminate itself 
END 
Figure 5.  The pseudocode for MA. 
START 
Initialize K1, plaintext 
K1= recreateKey(K1,LSL)  
plaintext = Decrypt(Ciphertext,K1) 
Send REQUEST to RA (“Check-plaintext”)  
(parameter: plaintext, H(P)) 
Receives INFORM with result (indicating 
plaintext is valid or not) 
Send INFORM to MA (“Finish-Encrypting”) to 
return result 
Terminate itself 
END 
Figure 6.  The pseudocode for Cd. 
RA will be instantiated when a REQUEST to send a 
message is received. The RA’s name will be returned to the 
requester along with an AGREE or REJECT message. RA 
will be in charged of communicating with MA in the process 
to decrypt a message. Figure 7 presents the pseudo code for 
RA. 
 
Class RA:(ACLMessage msg) 
START 
IF (“Process-Message”) is received 
Split(message)=Ciphertext, Ciphercode, 
Cipherkey 
Initialize privKr, pubKs 
privKr=ExtractPrivK(Rec’s keystore) 
pubKs=ExtractPubK(Sender’s cert). 
Decrypt(Cipherkey, privKr)=K2,H(Cd) 
Decrypt(Ciphercode,K2)= T, S, Cd. 
Validate(S,Cd)pubKs 
Initialize newH(Cd) 
newH(Cd)=computeHash(Cd) 
Compare(newH(Cd),H(Cd)). 
IF S and H(Cd) == valid 
   send INFORM to MA containing  “valid” 
END-IF 
END-IF 
IF (“Sign-Token”) is received 
Sign(Token,privKr) 
END-IF 
IF (“Check-plaintext”) is received 
Initialize newH(P) 
newH(P)=computeHash(P) 
IF Compare(newH(P),H(P))==true 
Put plaintext in a messageQueue 
Send notice to user 
END-IF 
END-IF 
END 
Figure 7.  The pseudocode for RA 
VI. RESULT 
A. Experimental Setup 
For the experiment, we create a controlled environment 
by using 2 PCs connected to each other in a LAN. Each 
computer is equipped with Pentium IV, 3 GHz CPU, and 1 
GB RAM. We calculate the execution times (in millisecond) 
for: 
(1)  Agent-based communications  
(2)  Non-agent based communications using Java 
socket  
In (1), we measure six types of executions using JADE-
agent with plaintexts sizes range from 50Kb to 300Kb. Since 
the mobile agent that carries the data to the Recipient’s host 
is not returning to the Sender’s host, the Round Trip Time 
(RTT) time cannot be measured. Therefore, we measure the 
time starting from the preparation of the data (generating 
Ciphertext, Cipherkey, and Ciphercode), sending the data 
across by MA, until Sender receives the token back from 
MA to ask for hashKey. We used the following five MLC 
security settings and one with no security: 
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i. Layer 1: data security (AES-256) and channel 
security 
ii. Layer 2: data security (Blowfish-184) 
iii. Layer 3: data security (AES-128) 
iv. Layer 4: data security (Blowfish-96) 
v. Communications that use SSL channel security only 
(option for Layer 3 and Layer 4) using mobile agent 
to transfer the plaintext. We use JADE-HTTPS 
setting such as in [14].  
vi. Communications with no security setting to transfer 
plaintexts, to measure the overhead cost of the 
security processes 
In (2), we use Java-socket with plaintexts sizes range 
from 1Mb to 10Mb. The same security setting is used as in 
(1) and six execution times are measured started from the 
preparation of data (same as in (1)), sends it through sockets 
to the Recipient, and until Recipient sends a simple message 
back to Sender to ask for hashKey. We also calculate Java-
socket communication with no security. For all data security, 
we choose CBC mode, and PKCS7 padding type. 
B. Simulation Results 
1) Agent based Communication  
Figure 8 shows the execution times taken for agent-based 
communication.  
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Figure 8.  The execution time for agent-based communciations 
The result shows that the communication that uses only 
channel security performs better than the other channel 
and/or data security agents. This is because, in the channel 
security communication, only SSL channel is establish, and 
it does not require any process for encryption, decryption, 
hash, or sign any plaintext. Moreover, the size of the 
plaintext transferred by the mobile agent does not change. 
For the channel and/or data security communications, the 
data security processes add up to the total data size that 
should be carried by MA, which is almost twice the size of 
the original plaintext. For example, for a plaintext with the 
size of 250Kb, the total size of data (containing ciphertext, 
cipherkey, and ciphercode) carried by the mobile agent to the 
recipient’s platform is about 464 Kb. 
From the result, we can also see that Blowfish algorithm 
has the superiority against AES-256 and AES-128, 
regardless of the key sizes. There is no effect of changing the 
Blowfish’s key lengths as both Blowfish-184 and Blowfish-
96 give almost similar throughputs for all plaintext sizes. The 
same result also found in [15].  
2) Java socket MLC Communication 
Figure 9 shows the execution times for Java-socket 
communications. The same pattern of the previous results 
can be observed. The result shows that the communications 
with the SSL-channel security perform better than the other 
communications. This is because there is no need to 
encrypt/decrypt, sign, or hash the plaintext. We can also find 
that Blowfish algorithm performs faster than both AESs. 
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Figure 9.  The execution time for Java-socket communications 
For the overhead calculations, we refer to Table II and 
Table III.  
TABLE II.  OVERHEAD OF 300KB COMMUNICATIONS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In Table II, we compare the result of the no security 
communications with 300Kb plaintext, with the other 
security settings for the agent-based communications. We 
found out that the SSL-only communication has over 200% 
overhead than the no security communication, Layer 4 and 
Layer 2 have the average of 7500% overhead, Layer 3 has 
7750% increment and Layer 1 has the highest overhead with 
over 8000%.  
For Java-socket, we compare the result of the no security 
communications with 10Mb plaintext, with the other security 
settings (depicted in Table III). We found out that the SSL-
only communication has lower overhead with only 78%, 
Layer 4 and Layer 2 have the average of 468% overhead, 
Security setting Percentage 
SSL only 283.4 
Layer 4 7468.2 
Layer 3 7750.6 
Layer 2 7504.7 
Layer 1 8152.6 
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Layer 3 has 492% and Layer 1 has the highest overhead with 
530%.  
Overheads projected by the agent-based communications 
are higher than the Java-socket communications. This is 
expected because it takes longer time for the multiple layers 
of communications among agents (refer to Figure 2), using 
ACL Language to complete the security protocols. Overhead 
of 10Mb communications  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
From the discussion, we can conclude that Layer 1 has 
the highest overhead compared to the other layer, because of 
the use of both data and channel security mechanisms.  For 
Layer 2, 3, and 4 that use data security, the selection of the 
algorithms is also an important issue. Because Blowfish is a 
faster algorithm than AES [16] regardless of the key lengths, 
we found out that Layer 2 and 4 have performed better than 
Layer 3 that used AES-128 algorithm. Therefore, the 
selection of the algorithm types should be taken into account 
when setting up the MLC. However, because MLC is a 
flexible approach, any algorithm can be chosen, as long it 
can give better performance to the communications. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
A security model base on multi-agent system is presented 
in this paper.  The agents are skilled with knowledge to cater 
for the security processes to secure online communications. 
The mobile agent is used as a supporting tool to carry 
sensitive data. Cryptographic protocols are used to secure 
data as well as the mobile agent code. Using this security 
model, Sender can gain control over the plaintext, because 
Recipient or any other third party does not know the details 
of the decryption processes. Experiments have been 
conducted and tested using Jade platform as a proof-of-
concept.  
Results showed that agents incur higher cost compared to 
the traditional method. However, it gives a much better 
control on security to the initiator of the communication with 
assuring security of the channel and at the Recipient’s node.  
The result also showed that Layer 1 communication has 
the highest overhead, due to data and channel security 
applied in the layer. The SSL-only communication has the 
lowest overhead. For Layer 2, 3, and 4 that use data security, 
we suggest that the selection of the algorithms characteristics 
should be taken into account before choosing them to fit into 
MLC.  
The layered structure improves efficiency based on the 
level of security decides at different levels. There can be a 
significant gain of efficiency for encryption, decryption, and 
transmission with a careful selection based on needs of the 
appropriate layers in the security model. This security model 
may fit in any types of domain. As our ongoing work, we are 
implementing the agent on mobile devices. 
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Security Setting Percentage 
SSL only 78.4 
Layer 4 466.0 
Layer 3 492.1 
Layer 2 470.2 
Layer 1 530.3 
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